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The Effect of Friends’ Churn on Consumer Behavior in Mobile Networks 
 
Abstract: We study how consumers decide which tariff plan to choose and whether to churn 
when their friends churn in the mobile industry. We develop a theoretical model showing 
conditions under which users remain with their carrier and conditions under which they churn 
when their friends do. We then use a large and rich anonymized longitudinal panel of call 
detailed records to characterize the consumers’ path to death with unprecedented level of 
detail. We explore the structure of the network inferred from these data to derive instruments 
for friends’ churn, which is typically endogenous in network settings. This allows us to 
econometrically identify the effect of peer influence in our setting. On average, we find that 
each additional friend that churns increases the monthly churn rate by 0.06%. The observed 
monthly churn rate across our dataset is 2.15%. We also find that firms introducing the pre-
paid tariff plans that charge the same price to call users inside and outside the carrier helps 
retain consumers that would otherwise churn. In our setting, without this tariff plan the 
monthly churn rate could have been as high as 8.09%. We perform a number of robustness 
checks, in particular to how we define friends in the social graph, and show that our results 
remain unchanged. Our paper shows that the traditional definition of customer lifetime value 
underestimates the value of consumers, and in particular that of consumers with more friends 
due to the effect of contagious churn and, therefore, managers should actively take into 
account the structure of the social network when prioritizing whom to target during retention 
campaigns. 
Key words and phrases: contagious churn, tariff plans, mobile industry  
Introduction 
Prices and switching costs have both decreased considerably in the mobile industry during 
the last couple of decades [17]. This trend has been propelled by the accelerated pace of 
innovation in wireless technologies as well as by regulatory changes. As a result, mobile 
markets became highly turbulent in recent times. Wireless carriers report churn rates as high 
as 2% per month both in the US and in Europe [43, 9]. New business opportunities arise 
when a quarter of the customer base changes every year. However, so do risks. As a result, 
churn management became a top priority for managers at wireless carriers who have now 
been investing significantly in churn prediction and customer retention. 
One important element of user churn is the behavior of the network. In particular, industry 
reports and academic papers highlight how friends’ behavior might influence one’s behavior 
[4, 7, 3, 16, 24, 55, 64]. The argument goes that friends’ churn encourages users to leave. One 
underlying mechanism for such influence is that when friends churn, they convey information 
about the quality of service at a competitor thus reducing uncertainty about it. This exchange 
of information through word of mouth may lead users to follow their friends. Another reason 
could be that many tariff plans have a differential pricing structure for calling inside vs. 
outside the network. This asymmetry in prices comes from termination charges among 
carriers to place calls across interconnected networks that pass along, in part, to users [50]. 
As friends churn, it may become economically sensible for users to also churn depending on 
their risk averseness. Besides churning, users may reduce their volume of calling. Of course, 
in response firms may offer tariff plans in which users pay similar prices to call inside and 
outside the carrier. 
Thus, friends’ churn may have a nuanced impact on a user’s behavior. It can vary from 
reducing the amount of time spent calling inside vs. outside the carrier, to changing tariff 
plan, to eventually churning. No paper in the past has explored this question in this detail, in 
part, due to the lack of granular data. Our work closes this gap and contributes to the extant 
literature in several ways. First, we develop a structural model of consumer behavior in 
which consumers choose to keep their tariff plan, change tariff plan or churn. Second, we use 
Call Detailed Records (CDRs) from a large mobile operator to infer the social network across 
a random sample of consumers and their friends. Using these CDRs and the choices of tariff 
plans made by users, we then explore how changes in the structure of this network affect the 
behavior of users. Our analysis looks not only at eventual churn decisions but also at the 
changes in tariff plan choices and in the volume of calls placed. Thus, we are able to 
characterize the path to death (i.e. the behavior of consumers on their way to churn) with an 
unprecedented level of detail allowing us to develop new actionable knowledge to the firm on 
early warnings of churn. For example, [4] analyzes only consumption over time whereas we 
highlight the role played by tariff plans that charge a similar price to call inside and outside 
the carrier as an effective deterrent of churn. Our paper measures the value associated to 
offering this type of tariff plans, which has not been reported before in the literature. 
It is well known that empirical identification on whether the behavior of friends affects one’s 
behavior is hard to obtain with just observational data because homophily and reverse 
causality hinder our ability to do so [ 42, 54, 24]. Furthermore, and according to [35], 
homophily is a human characteristic that changes overtime rather than a static attribute. 
Exploring the variation in homophily over time may help separate it from peer influence. Yet, 
and ideally, one would run a randomized field experiment to identify peer effects [3, 7]. 
However, randomized experiments are not always available. They are expensive, hard to 
design, and difficult to carry on in-vivo in real world settings. To establish causation, 
researchers have used instrumental variables [59], shuffling tests [1] and propensity score 
matching [2] to try to identify peer effects. All these methods aim at reducing one’s concern 
that the observed effect might be driven by unobserved covariates. In our paper, we use 
instrumental variables to try to identify the effect of peer influence. We use the churn of 
friends of friends who are not friends of an ego to instrument the churn of the friends of the 
ego (we use the term ego going forward to describe the user whose behavior we want to 
study). We provide multiple robustness checks showing that this instrumental variable is 
appropriate in our setup. 
Using the identification strategy described above, we find that when only a few friends churn 
egos simply adjust their volume of calls taking into account the increased price of calling the 
friends that churn. When more friends churn egos change to a tariff plan that charges the 
same price to call inside and outside the carrier. Lastly, when a significant number of friends 
churn egos also churn. One contribution of our work is to study the effect of friends’ churn 
on all these different outcome variables, thus allowing us to provide a more encompassing 
view of the consumers’ path to churn. On average across subscribers in our dataset, every 
time an additional friend churns the ego’s monthly likelihood of churn increases by 0.06%. 
Across our dataset, the monthly churn rate is 2.15%. We also find that a significant number 
of subscribers that would otherwise churn remain with the carrier and choose a tariff plan that 
charges the same price to call users inside and outside the carrier. Our results show that the 
introduction of this tariff plan avoided 5.94% in the monthly churn rate. Therefore, our 
results show clearly the value associated to tariff plans that charge the same price to call 
inside and outside the carrier, namely because of their effectiveness in reducing churn. 
Furthermore, a significant decrease in the amount of calling inside the network and a 
significant movement towards tariff plans that charge the same price to call inside and 
outside the network may provide early warnings of upcoming churn behavior (in a world 
without tariff plans that charge the same price to call inside and outside the carrier). These 
insights are likely to apply to other IT-related industries and, in general, to any industry with 
strong network effects, for example those with membership fees and where consumers are 
required to interact to complete the activity of interest (e.g. sports facilities). 
Literature Review 
Technical change and innovation in wireless technologies led to a significant decrease in the 
prices of handsets, voice communications and data transfer. The pervasiveness of Wireless 
Fidelity (Wi-Fi) and the massive deployment of Long-Term Evolution (LTE), both offering 
broadband speeds capable of supporting streaming services, allow for an unprecedented level 
of connectedness and mobility. In parallel, regulatory policy, such as Mobile Number 
Portability (MNP), which allows users to keep their phone number when changing carriers, 
also decreased switching costs considerably [17]. Mobile consumers can now churn more 
easily and do so more often. Mobile carriers in the US and Europe have reported annual 
churn rates as high as 25% [43, 9]. As a consequence, churn management became the number 
one priority for executives in mobile carriers. Managers now know that acquiring new 
customers is significantly more expensive than keeping current ones [8, 5, 29] and that long-
term customers are more valuable [22, 25] because they generate more profits, are less 
sensitive to marketing campaigns from competitors, become less costly to serve and are more 
likely to provide positive word of mouth. Consequently, customer retention became the 
primary goal of most churn management strategies. 
Customer retention has been shown to provide significant increases in profit [11, 20]. It 
typically involves two steps: 1) identify likely churners [45, 27]; and 2) offering retention 
incentives to top likely churners [62, 39]. The methods used to identify likely churners 
depend on the data available. With cross-sections, researchers have used logistic regression 
[44, 40, 32, 38, 46, 15], decision-trees [65, 3941, 49], neural networks [66, 57, 31, 47, 58, 6], 
support vector machines [33, 69, 18] and ensemble methods such as random forests [36, 67]. 
A comprehensive review of these models is provided in [63]. These methods aim at 
minimizing errors. They avoid misclassifying churners as non-churners and vice-versa. 
Unfortunately, they do not always agree on their findings, which depend largely on the 
datasets, parameters and configurations used [44, 31]. With longitudinal data researchers 
have used hazard models [8, 10, 52], Markov logic networks [21] and hidden Markov chains 
[4]. In these cases, researchers observe subscribers over time and characterize the dynamics 
of the “path to death” – how subscribers behave on their way to churn. In the context of pro-
active churn management, top churners are then targeted with retentions incentives such as 
special offers, discounts and personalized messages [10, 25, 53]. 
The lack of integration between the two steps in customer retention referred above in a single 
framework to optimize profits leads to sub-optimal results [62]. For example, top churners 
might be easy to retain but may also yield little value [13, 14, 26]. Customer Lifetime Value 
(CLTV) was introduced to acknowledge and measure heterogeneity in value across 
customers [51, 61, 26, 23]. CLTV is the discounted value of the future stream of profits that 
the firm can make off the consumer. However, the most basic definition of CLTV does not 
reflect the fact that subscribers interact in social networks and that these interactions may 
yield further value to the company. Often, the CLTV of a subscriber is only associated with 
the profits generated from the services she uses and disregards the profits generated from 
increased usage of services by her friends who might have been led to use such services via 
peer influence, such as word of mouth. These ripple effects may be particularly important in 
the case of churn management because word of mouth may also increase one’s propensity to 
churn when friends’ churn. The goal of our paper is to study whether this is the case and, if 
so, to provide unbiased estimates for the effect of such peer influence. 
However, obtaining unbiased estimates of peer influence in social networks is a challenging 
empirical question because reverse causality and latent homophily hinder our ability to do so 
using observational data [42, 54]. Several strategies have been pursued in the literature to try 
to identify peer influence. For example, [59] used exogenous shocks to the benefits of 
watching TV as instruments to identify peer influence in the adoption of video-messaging at 
an investment bank, [2] used dynamic propensity score matching to try to disentangle 
influence from homophily in the adoption of a mobile service application at Yahoo, [1] used 
randomization in distinct contexts to try to identify peer effects by comparing how their 
worlds were different from simulated worlds in which peer influence would have not played 
a role by design. More recently, [68] used a spatial autoregressive model to identify both the 
direct and indirect influence of peers in the adoption of caller ring back tones. Furthermore, a 
broad range of mechanisms can drive peer influence [56, 60, 37], such as information 
transmission, competition, conformity, network externalities and spatial proximity. These 
mechanisms can occur simultaneously and are difficult to disentangle empirically. 
The early estimates of peer influence in social networks overestimated the effect because they 
failed to separate it from homophily. More recent work found smaller, yet positive, effects of 
peer influence. For example, [28] analyze diffusion patterns in several online domains, 
including Twitter and Yahoo. They find similarities across all domains, namely that most 
adoption is part of very simple cascades of only one hop, and that only a very small fraction 
of adoptions are associated to longer cascades. Also, [2] look at peer influence in Yahoo 
messaging and conclude that homophily is responsible for at least 50% of the observed 
correlation. These works speak to the importance of using appropriate empirical strategies to 
avoid overestimating peer influence. In our paper we are interested in measuring peer 
influence, namely how a user changes her behavior when her friends churn. We use the 
structure of the social network to derive instruments to avoid overestimating the effect of 
peer influence in our setting. Furthermore, we use an ordered probit model allowing us to 
characterize the stages that users go through before churning. This allows to present evidence 
that a significant number of users tend to first adjust calling volumes, then they tend to 
change tariff plan inside the carrier and only latter consider churning to a competitor. The 
understanding that consumers exhibit this nuanced behavior before they churn may provide 
some lead time for the firm to act in order to retain consumers. 
Structural Model 
Consider a set of users indexed by 𝑖. Let 𝐹! represent the set of friends of user 𝑖. Let 𝐹!!" and 
𝐹!#$% represent the set of friends of user 𝑖 inside and outside the carrier used by user 𝑖, 
respectively. We have 𝐹!!" ∩ 𝐹!#$% = ∅ and 𝐹!!" ∪ 𝐹!#$% = 𝐹!. Friends’ churn moves them 
from 𝐹!!" to 𝐹!#$% and vice-versa for friends’ join. Let θ!,' ≥ 0 represent the intrinsic utility 
from calling user 𝑗. Let θ!!" = ∑ θ!,''∈)!!"  and θ!
#$% = ∑ θ!,''∈)!#$%  be associated with the 
aggregated utility from calling friends inside and outside the carrier, respectively. 
Users subscribe to a tariff plan. There are two types of tariff plans in the market. One type 
charges price 𝑝!" to call inside the carrier and price 𝑝#$% to call outside the carrier. Typically, 
𝑝!" < 𝑝#$% due to interconnection charges across carriers that pass, in part, to consumers. 
The other type of tariff plan charges the same price 𝑝. to call both inside and outside the 
carrier. Typically, 𝑝!" < 𝑝. < 𝑝#$%. Let 𝑠𝑝! ∈ {0,1} indicate whether user 𝑖 subscribers a tariff 
plan that charges the same price to calls inside and outside the carrier. 
Let ∑ θ!,'𝑙𝑜𝑔8𝑞!,':'∈)! + ∑ β𝑞!'𝑠𝑝!'∈)!  represent the utility of user 𝑖, where 𝑞!' represents the 
number of calls placed by user 𝑖 to user 𝑗, θ!,' > 0 and 𝛽 is a (positive or negative) real 
number. This functional form captures well the utility derived from placing calls. The higher 
the 𝜃!,' the more value derived from calling user 𝑗. The more calls made to user 𝑗 the higher 
the utility and the lower the marginal utility from calling her. Note that with this functional 
form 𝜃!,' is readily interpreted as the share of calls placed to user 𝑗. In this setting, parameter 
𝛽 measures the additional utility, potentially negative, that users derive from subscribing a 
tariff plan that charges the same price to call inside and outside the carrier. This parameter 
measures, for example, the user’s aversion to risk and is related to her beliefs about what her 
friends will do. For example, a user who believes that a significant number of her friends will 
churn (in the same time period or in the future) will derive more utility from subscribing in 
advance a tariff plan that charges the same price to call inside and outside the carrier to 
mitigate the risk. In this case, we expect 𝛽 to be positive and large. On the contrary, users 
who are more risk loving are unlikely to act upon this risk and thus subscribing in advance a 
tariff plan that charges the same price to call inside and outside the carrier would reduce their 
utility. In this case, 𝛽 would be negative. Alternatively, the second term in the utility function 
could also be written as (𝑠𝑝!) Bβ!" ∑ 𝑞!''∈)!!" + β#$% ∑ 𝑞!''∈)!#$% C. In this specification, 𝛽!" 
would be negative and capture the penalty from adopting a tariff plan that charges the same 
price to call inside and outside the network, thus indexed to the amount of calls placed inside 
the carrier, and 𝛽#$% would be positive and capture the benefit from using such type of tariff 
plan, thus indexed to the amount of calls placed to outside the carrier. Yet, the former 
specification with only one parameter 𝛽 readily allows for measuring the aggregate effect of 
offering a tariff plan that charges the same price to call inside and outside the carrier, and 
thus easier to use in order to provide a measure of the value of introducing this type of tariff 
plan in the market. 
Let 𝑤! represent the fixed budget allocated by user 𝑖 to calls. This has been shown to change 
little from month to month. Users maximize their utility subject to the budget constraint 
∑ 𝑞!'8𝑠𝑝!𝑝. + (1 − 𝑠𝑝!)𝑝!'
!"/#$%:'∈)! ≤ 𝑤!, where 𝑝!'
!"/#$% = 𝑝!"{𝑗 ∈ 𝐹!!"} + 𝑝#$%{𝑗 ∈ 𝐹!#$%}. 
The budget constraint limits the number of calls that users can place by taking their price into 
account, and in particular by taking into account that asymmetric tariff plans charge different 
prices for call inside and outside the carrier. This yields three distinct regimes depending on 
the risk profile of the user, as depicted in Figure 1: 
1) risk loving: if 𝛽 > 𝛽+ then users will always prefer to subscribe the tariff plan that charges 
the same price to call inside and outside the carrier; 
2) risk averse: if 𝛽 < 𝛽, users will always prefer to subscriber a tariff plan that changes a 
lower price to call inside the carrier and will churn iff θ#$%/θ!" > 1; 
3) otherwise: if 𝛽, < 𝛽 < 𝛽+ then users will switch between tariff plan types depending on 
θ#$%/θ!". If θ#$%/θ!" < 𝑡#/! they will prefer a tariff plan that charges a lower price to call 
inside the carrier. If θ#$%/θ!" > 1/𝑡#/! they will prefer to churn and subscribe a tariff plan 
that charges a lower price to call inside the carrier. In between, they will prefer a tariff plan 
that charges the same price to call inside and outside the carrier. 
In the above β, = (θ!𝑝./𝑤)𝑙𝑜𝑔 I𝑝./J𝑝!"𝑝#$%K and β+ = (θ!𝑝./𝑤)𝑙𝑜𝑔8𝑝./𝑝!":. In addition, 
𝑡#/! = L𝑙𝑜𝑔8𝑝./𝑝!": − (β𝑤)/(θ!𝑝.)M/[𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝#$%/𝑝.) + (β𝑤)/(θ!𝑝.)]. Appendix 8.1 includes 
the derivation of the above conditions that Figure 9 illustrates. The intuition behind this 
figure is the following. Users who are very risk averse will subscribe a tariff plan that charges 
the same price to call inside and outside the carrier at all times. On the other hand, users who 
are very risk loving will subscribe a tariff plan that charges a lower price to call inside the 
carrier at all times. The former also prefer to churn when they have many friends outside their 
carrier. Finally, users in between switch between tariff plan types depending on which carrier 
their friends are. If a significant number of friends are inside their carrier then users prefer a 
tariff plan that charges a lower price to call inside the carrier. If a significant number of 
friends are outside their carrier then users prefer to churn and subscribe this type of tariff plan 
with the competitor. In between, users prefer a tariff plan that charges the same price to call 
inside and outside the carrier. In this case they are indifferent with respect to which carrier 
they subscribe. Still, it is still reasonable to assume that when changing from a tariff plan that 
charges a lower price to call inside the carrier to a tariff plan that charges the same price to 
call inside and outside the carrier users will remain with their current carrier. Although pre-
paid users face always little switching costs it is still harder to switch carrier than switching 
tariff plans within the same carrier. 
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Context, Dataset and Descriptive Statistics 
Dataset, Communications Graph and Friends 
Our dataset covers 11 months of records between August 2008 and June 2009. We have the 
anonymized phone numbers of the caller and the callee, a timestamp for when the call is 
placed and the duration of the call for all calls originated or received by a subscriber of 
OurNet. We also have the anonymized phone numbers of the sender and the receiver for 
every text message sent or received by a subscriber of OurNet. We have a set of 
characteristics such as date of birth and gender but only for a small fraction of OurNet 
subscribers. We also know their tariff plan and when they changed it. Our dataset comprises 
roughly 3.7 billion calls and 13 billion text messages. 
We use this dataset to define an undirected graph of communications across OurNet 
subscribers over this period of 11 months. Two subscribers are connected in this graph if one 
of them called or sent a text message to the other and the latter answered back with a call or a 
text message within the same calendar month. This procedure allows us to eliminate sporadic 
communications that are unlikely to proxy social proximity such as those with message bots, 
short numbers and call centers. Our graph has 4,986,131 subscribers and 57,069,798 
undirected edges. The density of the graph, defined by 2𝐸/8𝑉(𝑉 − 1):, where 𝐸 is the 
number of edges and 𝑉 is the number of subscribers, is 4.6 ∗ 10-.. We say that two 
subscribers are friends inside OurNet if they are connected in this graph. 
Definition of Churn 
Prepaid subscribers can easily obtain SIM cards, for example from a supermarket shelf, 
without providing much information to OurNet. The only indication that a prepaid subscriber 
had churned from OurNet is prolonged absence of activity. OurNet follows the industry 
standard and considers that a subscriber churns when she does not place calls or sends text 
messages for at least 3 months in a row. We followed this definition of churn in this paper, 
which has also been used in several prior works, namely [34, 30]. The number of prepaid 
subscribers who place calls or send text messages after 3 months of inactivity is less than 1% 
in our dataset, therefore using a longer definition for churn would have a negligible impact on 
our results. If a subscriber does not place calls in months 𝑥 + 2, 𝑥 + 3 and 𝑥 + 4 we consider 
that she decided to churn in month 𝑥. We assume that month 𝑥 + 1 is used to wind down any 
remaining balance. Our panel of data covers 11 months but gets 4 months shorter due to our 
definition of churn. Therefore, throughout this paper, our period of analysis is 7 months, 
between September 2008 and March 2009. 
Sampling Strategy and Number of Friends 
We random sampled 10,000 subscribers from our graph. From these subscribers, 280 were 
discarded because their out degree was 3 standard deviations above the mean. Trimming 
these subscribers allows us to eliminate PBXs machines as well as to keep the size of the 
social graph computationally manageable for analysis. Other 120 subscribers were discarded 
because they joined OurNet after June 2009 and thus we have no information about who they 
called or text messaged. 700 subscribers were discarded because they had no friends. An 
additional 555 subscribers were discarded because we cannot know for sure whether they 
churned and if so when: 239 of them were last active before October 2008, the other 316 
joined OurNet after March 2009. Finally, we drop an additional 162 subscribers who never 
place calls. The remaining customers place an average of 32.9 calls per month and receive an 
average of 40.0 calls per month (in the top quartile these statistics become 42 and 53, 
respectively).  
After these adjustments, we were left with 8,183 subscribers in our sample, which we used 
throughout the analysis in this paper. We use 50,888 observations of which 58% are for 5,579 
unique subscribers using a tariff plan that charges the same price to call inside and outside the 
carrier. The remainder of the observations pertain to 3,891 unique subscribers observed using 
a tariff plan that charges a lower price to call inside the carrier. The average number of 
friends inside the carrier is 19.23 and 32.35 for users with and without a tariff plan that 
charges the same price to call inside the carrier, respectively (the standard deviation is 22.05 
and 27.70, respectively). The median is 11 and 24 friends, respectively. The size of the social 
network of a subscriber is her number of friends inside and outside the carrier. We count the 
number of friends outside the carrier using the same definition of friend as for inside the 
carrier. The average size of the social network is 25.63 and 50.54 for subscribers with and 
without a tariff plan that charges the same price to call inside the carrier, respectively (the 
standard deviation is 26.48 and 32.52 friends, respectively). The median is 16 and 32 friends, 
respectively. We note that according to this measure, the size of the social network does not 
change much over time. On average, it increases 0.10 and 0.15 friends per month, 
respectively. Therefore, subscribers with tariff plans that charge a lower price to call inside 
the carrier have significantly larger social networks. 
The 8,183 subscribers in our sample are called egos. In this paper we need to characterize the 
churn of the friends of egos and the churn of the friends of the friends of egos. We do so by 
using our communications graph to snowball two waves out from the egos. The average 
number of friends of friends of our egos is 974 with a standard deviation of 1,152. The 8,183 
subscribers in our sample have 191,996 unique friends and 2,566,283 unique friends of 
friends and thus, in fact, we are working with millions of subscribers in this analysis. 
Calling Behavior 
Figure 2 shows the average number of calling minutes per month to friends inside and outside 
the carrier. The average number of minutes per month is 139.95 and 8.05 inside and outside 
the carrier, respectively for users with a tariff plan that changes a lower price to call inside 
the carrier. These statistics are 20.07 and 8.23, respectively, for users with tariff plans that 
charge the same price to call inside and outside the carrier. Therefore, the latter exhibit 
significantly lower calling activity. As Figure 3 shows the distribution of airtime inside the 
carrier is highly skewed. In March 2009, 40% of subscribers with a tariff plan that charges a 
lower price to call inside the carrier call at least 1 hour per month and 10% of them call more 
than 3 hours per month. These statistics are 8% and 2%, respectively, for users with a tariff 
plan that charges the same price to call inside and outside the carrier. 
XXX FIGURE 2 XXX 
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This staggering difference between calling time inside and outside the carrier, which also 
characterizes the distribution of sms inside and outside the network, is related to the fact that 
OurNet operates under a sender-pays-all model. Under this regime, the caller pays for all 
calls placed. The callee does not pay for calls received. As a consequence, carriers 
compensate each other for calls terminated at other carriers. The price charged to the caller 
covers the costs to provision the call end-to-end. At the interconnection point to another 
network the carrier where the call originates pays a termination fee to the carrier where the 
call terminates so that the latter can provision the appropriate network infrastructure to 
terminate the call. Carriers pass part of this cost to consumers under tariff plans that charge a 
higher price to call outside the career. Naturally, there are no termination charges for calls 
within the same network. 
Calling behavior is intimately related to the choice of tariff plan. 53 different tariff plans are 
used by subscribers in our sample, of which 39 charge the same price to call inside and 
outside the network. The announced average price per minute across these tariff plans is 21.4 
cents to call inside the carrier and 34.6 cents to call outside the carrier. Subscribers in our 
sample spend, on average, 13.42 euros per month. Eventual churners and non-churners spend, 
on average, 9.52 and 13.70 euros per month, respectively. Subscribers with and without a 
tariff plan that charges the same price to call inside and outside the carrier spend 9.37 and 
18.51 euros per month on average, respectively. Therefore, subscribers with a tariff plan that 
charges the same price to call inside and outside the carrier spend more per month though 
exhibit less calling activity. Summing up over all observations, users with a tariff plan that 
charges the same price to call inside and outside the carrier generate 251k (39%) and 393k 
(61%) euros of revenue over the period of analysis (7 months). The amount spent per month 
changes only slightly over time. Eventual churners spend, on average, 36 cents less every 
month. Non-churners spend 9 cents more every month, on average. 
Ego’s Churn and Join 
Churn is significant in our dataset and seems to have increased in the second half of our 
panel. 1,095 subscribers in our sample churned during the period of analysis (13.38%): 830 
with a tariff plan that charges the same price to call inside and outside the carrier (14.8%) and 
265 with a tariff plan that charges a lower price to call inside the carrier (6.8%). Figure 4 
shows that among subscribers with a tariff plan that charges a lower price to call inside the 
carrier, those that spend more time calling other networks churn at a higher rate (1.93% vs. 
1.19% (𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 < 0.01) per month on average) than those who spend more time calling 
inside the carrier. Intuitively, subscribers that call more outside the carrier are “closer” to the 
other networks and thus might be among the first ones to consider churn when calling friends 
in other networks costs more. Figure 4 also shows that the reverse is true for subscribers with 
a tariff plan that charges the same price to call inside and outside the carrier, for whom, these 
statistics are 2.48% and 2.89%, respectively (𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 < 0.04). 
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The churn rate is significant in our dataset (13.8% in 7 months extrapolates linearly to 
roughly 24% per year) but so is the join rate as Figure 4 shows. This allows the carrier to 
keep a steady size for its customer base. However, newer consumers are known to be less 
loyal than older ones. The monthly churn rate as a function of age peaks at 6% for 
subscribers that have been 1 month with the company, declines to roughly 3% for subscribers 
that are half a year with the company and is, on average, 0.9% for subscribers that have been 
with the company for more than a year and a half. 
Finally, the top of Table 1 shows the number of subscribers and observations per type of 
tariff plan and as function of whether there are more or less friends inside the carrier. We 
note that the majority of observations have more friends inside the carrier (roughly 95% and 
85% for users with (𝑠𝑝 = 0) and without (𝑠𝑝 = 1) a tariff plan that charges a lower price to 
call inside the carrier, respectively). The bottom part of this table shows averages and 
standard deviations for churn rates. The churn rate is always higher for users with tariff plans 
that charge the same price to call inside and outside the carrier (0.013 vs 0.028 (𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 <
0.001), 0.012 vs 0.027 (𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 < 0.001), for subscribers with and without more friends 
inside the carrier, respectively, and 0.012 vs 0.028 (𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 < 0.001) for all users) but 
statistically similar for users with and without more friends inside the carrier irrespective of 
their tariff plan type (0.024 vs. 0.021 (𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 0.19), 0.013 vs 0.012 (𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 =
0.81) and 0.028 vs. 0.027 (𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 0.70) for total, 𝑠𝑝 = 0 and 𝑠𝑝 = 1, respectively). 
These descriptive statistics show that churn is significant across users with a tariff plan that 
charges the same price to call inside and outside the carrier, which may mean that this type of 
tariff plan is ineffective at reducing churn. 
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Friends’ Churn and Join 
Figure 5 shows the average number of friends that churn for eventual churners and non-
churners both per month and cumulative since the beginning of our panel for users with and 
without a tariff plan that charges the same price to call inside the carrier. The average number 
of friends that churn, either per month or cumulatively, is always higher for users with a tariff 
plan that charges a lower price to call inside the carrier (0.148 vs. 0.237 (𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 < 0.001) 
and 0.464 vs. 0.748 (𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 < 0.001), respectively). 10% and 25% of the subscribers 
with and without a tariff plan that charges the same price to call inside and outside the carrier 
have at least one friend that churned over the period of analysis, respectively. In both cases, 
10% of the subscribers have at least one friend that churned per month. However, note that 
the number of friends that churn, either per month or cumulative, is significantly larger for 
eventual churners among users with a tariff plan that charges a lower price to call inside the 
carrier (0.23 vs. 0.49 (𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 < 0.001) and 0.73 vs. 1.20 (𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 < 0.001), 
respectively), which is not true for the case of cumulative number of friends that churn for 
users with a tariff plan that charges the same price to call inside and outside the carrier (0.15 
vs. 0.17 (𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 < 0.02) and 0.46 vs. 0.46 (𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 0.83), respectively). 
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Figure 6 shows the average number of friends that join for eventual churners and non-
churners both per month and cumulative since the beginning of our panel for users with and 
without a tariff plan that charges the same price to call inside and outside the carrier. In this 
case, this statistic is lower for eventual churners for the former type of user and higher for the 
latter (0.43 vs. 0.69 (𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 < 0.001) and 1.89 vs. 2.15 (𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 < 0.02) per month 
and cumulative, respectively, for the former and 0.30 vs. 0.23 (𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 < 0.001) and 1.25 
vs. 0.73 (𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 < 0.01) per month and cumulative, respectively, for the latter). All these 
analysis remains unchanged if we consider the ratio of the number of friends that churn and 
join to the logarithm of the size of the social network, which we will use later in our 
regressions to control for the number of friends. 
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Empirical Strategy 
The theoretical model developed before shows that, in our setting, choosing a tariff plan and 
churning is a function of θ#$%/θ!". Therefore, our empirical strategy to study the effect of 
this covariate on churn is to regress churn on it. For this purpose, let the ordinal covariate 
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒!,% indicate whether user 𝑖 in month 𝑡 i) has a tariff plan that charges a higher price to 
call outside the carrier; ii) has a tariff plan that charges the same price to call inside and 
outside the carrier; iii) churns. Later in this paper, we provide empirical evidence showing 
that this is the appropriate ordering for these outcomes. Accordingly, we estimate 
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒!,% = γ/ + γ0θ!,%#$%/θ!,%!" + 𝑑% + ϵ!,% 
where 𝑑% are month dummies and 𝜖!,% is the idiosyncratic error term. Assuming that the error 
term is normally distributed yields the traditional ordered Probit regression, which we will 
use to estimate two cut-off points: 𝑡/, beyond which users are no longer better off with a tariff 
plan that charges a lower price to call inside the carrier; and 𝑡0, beyond which users are better 
off churning. In addition, we are interested in parameter 𝛾0, which measures how marginal 
changes in friends churning and joining affects the decision to change tariff plan and/or 
carrier. However, recall that θ!,%#$% = θ!,%-/#$% + 𝑓𝑟𝑑_𝑐ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛!,% (where 𝑓𝑟𝑑_𝑐ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛!,% indicates the 
cumulative number of friends of user 𝑖 than churned up to time 𝑡), and therefore this 
parameter is unidentified in this regression to the extent that 𝜖!,% includes time-varying effects 
that affect the likelihood of churn of both user 𝑖 and her friends. For example, user 𝑖 and her 
friends can be exposed to marketing campaigns that trigger all of them to churn irrespective 
of whatever influence there might have been at play. The month dummies in 𝑑% capture some 
dynamic effects that may explain heterogeneity in churn. For example, time dummies capture 
the effect of a reduction in price by a competitor, which may lead some consumers to churn 
from OurNet. There is no price discrimination across new consumers in the market that we 
analyze, that is, price reductions by competitors are similar for all users that would like to 
switch carriers and, therefore, captured by time dummies. However, time dummies are not 
enough to provide identification because they do not control for the heterogeneity associated 
to time varying effects unknown to us. 
We use an instrumental variable to alleviate these endogeneity concerns. Consider three users 
labeled 𝑖, 𝑗 and 𝑘. User 𝑖 is a friend of user 𝑗 and user 𝑗 is a friend of user 𝑘. Our goal is to 
use the churn decision of user 𝑘 to instrument the churn decision of user 𝑗. We argue that 
because users 𝑗 and 𝑘 are friends their churn decisions correlate. Significant empirical 
evidence in many network contexts has shown that this correlation, termed 1-hop homophily 
in the literature, is generally strong [2]. Our first stage results will show that this is also 
strong in our empirical case. However, the churn decision of user 𝑘 may correlate to the 
churn decision of user 𝑖 through unobserved mechanisms. In particular, this is likely to be the 
case with 1-hop homophily when user 𝑖 and user 𝑘 are friends. To lessen this concern, we 
consider only the churn decisions of users 𝑘 that are not friends of user 𝑖 to instrument user 
𝑗’s decision to churn. We call these users friends of friends not friends of the ego, “ffnf” for 
short, and use 𝑐ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛_𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑓	to refer to their churn decisions. Therefore, we assume absence 
of 2-hop homophily in order to use the churn decision of such a user 𝑘 to instrument the 
churn decision of user 𝑗. To further support this assumption, we show that the churn decision 
of user 𝑘 has no bearing on the churn decision of user 𝑖 conditional on the churn decision of 
user 𝑗. For example, when user 𝑗 does not churn the churn decision of user 𝑘 is irrelevant for 
the churn decision of user 𝑖. We use the following regression for this purpose: 
𝑐ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛!,% = α1 + α2𝑓𝑛𝑐𝑓𝑛𝑓_𝑐ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛!,% + 𝑋!,%α3 + 𝑢! + 𝑑% + ν!,% 
where 𝑓𝑛𝑐𝑓𝑛𝑓_𝑐ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛 represents the churn decisions of users 𝑘 when the users 𝑗 that connect 
them to user 𝑖 do not churn, that is the friends that do not churn of friends of the ego, not 
(direct) friends of the ego – “fncfnf” for short. As Figure 7 shows, user 𝑖 and such a user 𝑘 
belong to different cliques in the social network, which reduces largely the likelihood of 
unobserved effects that act upon both of them. 
XXX FIGURE 7 XXX 
As a robustness check we rely only on the churn decisions of users 𝑘 that share only one 
friend, user 𝑗, with user 𝑖 to instrument user 𝑗’s decision to churn. We denote these decisions 
by 𝑐ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛_𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑓_1𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ. As Figure 8 shows, this ensures not only that user 𝑖 and user 𝑘 
belong in different cliques but also that user 𝑗 is the only user in common between these 
cliques, which further reduces the likelihood of unobserved effects that act upon both user 𝑖 
and user 𝑘. In particular, in this case, it is likely that the correlation between the churn 
decisions of user 𝑘 and user 𝑖 flows through the only user connecting their cliques or, in other 
words, our instrument correlates with our outcome only through the endogenous variable 
(user 𝑗’s decision to churn). We also show that the churn decision of such a user 𝑘 has no 
bearing on the churn decision of user 𝑖 conditional on the churn decision of user 𝑗 by 
regressing 𝑐ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛!,% on 𝑐ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛_𝑓𝑛𝑐𝑓𝑛𝑓_1𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ!,%, where the latter represents the churn 
decisions of such users 𝑘 when user 𝑗, the only user in between a user 𝑘 and user 𝑖, does not 
churn. An additional restriction that could potentially be introduced would be to consider 
only the churn of friends of friends of the ego (not friends of the ego) that live in other cities 
than the ego. This would introduce separation not only in the call graph but also in terms of 
geographical proximity. Unfortunately, in our case, we are unable to generate this type of 
instrument because we do not have geographical information. However, future research may 
be able to do so and introduce even more separation between egos and their instruments. 
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With these instruments in hands, which are inspired in the work of [12] and [19], we develop 
the corresponding instruments for θ!,%#$%/θ!,%!" . Given that θ!,%#$% = θ!,%-/#$% + 𝑓𝑟𝑑_𝑐ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛!,% we use 
8θ!,%-/#$% + 𝑐ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛_𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑓!,%:/θ!,%!"  as an instrument for the former. For the abovementioned 
robustness check we use 8θ!,%-/#$% + 𝑐ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛_𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑓_1𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ!,%:/θ!,%!"  as instrument. 
Empirical Results 
Shift in Calls When Friends Churn 
When friends churn the likely reaction from users who subscribe tariff plans that charge a 
higher price to call outside the carrier is to adjust the calling pattern. These users are likely to 
call less often the friends that churn because it becomes more expensive to do so. On the 
other hand, users who subscribe to tariff plans that charge the same price to call inside and 
outside the carrier are less likely to make such an adjustment. Table 2 shows precisely this. 
Column (1) show results for users with a tariff plan that charges a lower price to call inside 
the carrier and columns (2) show results for users with a tariff plan that charges the same 
price to call inside and outside the carrier. In both cases the dependent variable is the 
percentage of monthly costs with calls inside the carrier. This decreases only for the former 
users when their friends churn, about 0.20% per each 1% increase in the cumulative number 
of friends that churn. This change in the volume of calls inside vs. outside the network might 
be seen as the firm as an early warning for churn. 
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Irrelevance of 2-Hop Churn Decisions 
Table 3 shows the results from regressing the churn decisions of egos in our dataset 
(subscribers 𝑖 in our model) on the churn decisions of the friends of their friends that are not 
friends of the egos (subscribers 𝑘 in our model) when the subscribers that connect them do 
not churn. The latter are used as instruments for the former. This table shows that when the 
friends of the ego do not churn the churn decisions of their friends have no bearing on the 
churn decision of the ego. In other words, in this case, whether the subscribers we use as 
instruments churn is irrelevant for the ego’s decision to churn and thus this test provides 
some evidence that our instrumental variable is exogenous in our setting. 
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Choice of Tariff Plan and Churn 
Table 4 shows our empirical results. Column (1) shows ordered Probit results while columns 
(2) and (3) show IV ordered Probit results using the instruments discussed in previous 
sections. In all specifications increases in θ#$%/θ!" reduce the probability of subscribing a 
tariff plan that charges a lower price to place calls inside the carrier (𝑠𝑝! = 0) and increase 
the probability of subscribing a tariff plan that charges the same price to place calls inside 
and outside the carrier (𝑠𝑝! = 1) and of churning. Using the results in column (3) yields that 
a marginal increase in 𝜃#$%/𝜃!" reduces the probability of 𝑠𝑝! = 0 by 11.8 percentage points, 
increases the probability of 𝑠𝑝! = 1 by 10.3 percentage points and increases the probability 
of churn by 1.5 percentage points. At the average, one more friend churning increases 
𝜃#$%/𝜃!" from 0.46 to 0.50, which leads to an increase of 0.06% in the monthly churn rate. 
The average monthly churn rate in our dataset is 2.15%. 
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The estimate of 2.195 for the cut-off point from 𝑠𝑝! = 1 (last column of table 4) to churn 
implies that, on average, users churn if θ#$%/θ!" > (𝑐𝑢𝑡0 − 𝑑%)/γ0 = (2.195 − 0.024)/
0.304 = 7.14, and thus 𝑡#/! = 1/7.14 = 0.14 on average (0.024 is the average effect of the 
time dummies). This result, in turn, implies β = I𝑙𝑜𝑔8𝑝./𝑝!": − 1/𝑡#/!𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝#$%/𝑝.)K (θ!𝑝.)/
I𝑤81/𝑡#/! + 1:K = 0.0028 on average. As expected, this estimate is between the average 
𝑏, = 0.00145 and the average 𝑏+ = 0.00324 in our data. Therefore, offering a tariff plan 
that charges the same price to call inside and outside the carrier leads this provider to retain a 
number of users who would otherwise churn. Column (3) in Table 4 shows that the predicted 
penetration of the tariff plan that charges the same price to call inside and outside the carrier 
is 0.568, that is 𝑃𝑟(𝑠𝑝 = 1) = 0.568. The predicted penetration of this tariff plan increases 
to 0.696 when computed only over users with more friends outside the carrier, that is 
𝑃𝑟8 𝑠𝑝 = 1 ∣∣ θ#$%/θ!" > 1 : = 0.696. We want to predict how many subscribers have this 
type of tariff plan and more friends outside the carrier, that is 𝑃𝑟8𝑠𝑝 = 1 ∧ θ#$%/θ!" > 1: to 
measure how the introduction of this tariff plan helped retained consumers that would have 
otherwise churned. Using the Bayes rule we have 𝑃𝑟8𝑠𝑝 = 1 ∧ θ#$%/θ!" > 1: =
𝑃𝑟8 𝑠𝑝 = 1 ∣∣ θ#$%/θ!" > 1 :𝑃𝑟8θ#$%/θ!" > 1:. In our dataset we have 4346 observations 
out of 50888 with θ#$% > θ!". Therefore, the introduction of the tariff plan that charges the 
same price to call inside and outside the carrier avoided 5.94% (0.696 ∗ 4346/50888) in the 
monthly churn rate. For comparison, the monthly churn rate across our dataset is 2.15%. 
Hence, the introduction of this tariff plan had a significant effect on customer retention. 
Finally, our ordered probit model provides evidence of a path to death that firms can 
potentially identify in a timely fashion as early warnings of churn. Recall that we coded our 
dependent variable, 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒!,% in order from i) a tariff plan that charges a lower price to call 
inside the carrier; ii) a tariff plan that charges the same price to call inside and outside the 
carrier; iii) and churn. Our empirical analysis shows the adjustment in the volume of call 
under i) and positive probabilities of transition from i) to ii) and from ii) to iii). Therefore, 
using the granular data available to us we are able to characterize the users’ behavior towards 
churn with a level of detail that the current literature has not yet been able to provide. 
Robustness Checks 
We perform a number of robustness checks to our IV results to show that our findings are not 
an artifact of the definition of friend nor of the structure imposed by our theoretical model. 
For the former, we start by noting that friends are likely to call each other more often. 
Therefore, consider user 𝑖 and let us define that user 𝑗 is a friend of user 𝑖 only if she is in the 
top quartile of the distribution of calls exchanged (that is, placed and received) by user 𝑖. This 
definition ensures that user 𝑖 and user 𝑗 talk significantly and, at the same time, corrects for 
the calling behavior of user 𝑖, that is, not all users 𝑗 that talk a lot with user 𝑖 are friends of 
user 𝑖 but only those that do so proportionally more. We redefine the social graph using this 
definition of friend and redo the analysis reported in the previous subsection. Columns (1) 
and (2) of Table 5 show the results obtained, which are qualitatively similar to the ones 
obtained before. Namely, increases in θ#$%/θ!" reduce the probability of subscribing a tariff 
plan that charges a lower price to place calls inside the carrier (𝑠𝑝! = 0) and increase the 
probability of subscribing a tariff plan that charges the same price to place calls inside and 
outside the carrier (𝑠𝑝! = 1) and of churning. In another specification, let user 𝑗 be a 
strongfriend of user 𝑖 if she is in the top quartile of the distribution of calls exchanged by user 
𝑖 and let user 𝑘 be a weakfriend of user 𝑖 is she is in the bottom quartile of the distribution of 
calls exchanged by user 𝑖. We redo the analysis reported in the previous subsection 
considering both (and simultaneously) the effect of strong and weak friends. Columns (3) and 
(4) of Table 5 show the results obtained, which are in line with our intuition for our setting. 
The likelihood of moving to a tariff plan that charges the same price to call inside and outside 
the carrier and of churning increases more when a strong friend churns compared to when a 
weak friend does. Finally, consider the case of a fully connected social graph in which the 
edge between users 𝑖 and 𝑗 is labeled with the airtime between them. In this graph, we can 
defined weighted friends using the share of airtime, that is, the weight associated to user 𝑗 for 
user 𝑖 is given by 𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒!'/∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒!44∈)! . We can then redo the analysis reported in the 
previous subsection using these weights to weight friends’ churn (likewise for the churn of 
friends of friends for our IVs). Columns (5) and (6) of Table 5 show the results obtain. Again, 
we still find that increases in θ#$%/θ!" increase the likelihood of moving to a tariff plan that 
charges the same price to call inside and outside the carrier and of churn. In sum, all these 
results provide evidence that our findings do not seem to arise because of the way friends are 
defined. We also note that all these models include the number of calls placed and received as 
additional controls.	
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We also test for the appropriateness of our ordered model. To this end, we start by running 
separate models for the decision to choose tariff plan type and for the decision to churn. 
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 6 show the results obtained for the former decision. These 
results show that increases in θ#$%/θ!" increase the likelihood of moving to a tariff plan that 
charges the same price to call inside and outside the carrier. Columns (3) and (4) in this table 
show the results obtained for the latter decision. We also observe here that increases in 
θ#$%/θ!" increase the likelihood of churn. It is therefore clear that even with separate models 
increases in θ#$%/θ!" behave as expected in both cases. We then model our setting using a 
multinomial logit model, which does not impose a specific ordering of outcomes as our 
ordered probit model does. In our multinomial logit model, consumers choose one of three 
alternatives: i) a tariff plan that charges a lower price to call inside and outside the carrier; ii) 
a tariff plan that charges the same price to call inside and outside the carrier; iii) churn, and 
they make a decision as a function of θ#$%/θ!". Columns (5) and (6) in table 6 show our 
results, which are obtained using the control function approach to address endogeneity, that 
is, we project our endogenous variable θ#$%/θ!" onto our instruments (first stage) and 
bootstrap 1000 times controlling for the first stage residuals to adjust the standard errors (see 
[48] for more information on this empirical strategy). The results shown in these columns are 
against choosing the tariff plan that charges the same price to call inside and outside the 
carrier, which allows us to show clear evidence that the ordering of outcomes is indeed as one 
could expect. The estimates in row 1 of these columns show that increases in θ#$%/θ!" reduce 
the likelihood of choosing a tariff plan that charges a lower price to call inside the carrier 
(compared to the baseline alternative, i.e. against choosing a tariff plan that charges the same 
price to call inside and outside the carrier). The estimates in row 4 show that increases in 
𝜃#$%/𝜃!" increase the likelihood of churn (again compared to the baseline alternative, i.e. 
choosing a tariff plan that charges the same price to call inside and outside the carrier). In 
sum, this exercise provides clear evidence in favor of the ordered outcomes as used in our 
theoretical model and in our ordered probit regressions. 
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Finally, we study the nature of the effect of friends’ churn. If this effect indeed arises from 
word of mouth among friends, then one may expect some sort of compounding or 
immediateness to arise. In the analysis in the previous subsection, friends’ churn is a 
cumulative measure, that is, 𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠_𝑐ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛!,% is the cumulative number of friends of user 𝑖 
that churned up to time 𝑡. Mathematically, 𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠_𝑐ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛!,% = ∑ ∑ 𝑐ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛',5'∈)!56% . Let us 
know affect friends’ churn with a “remembrance” discount factor. Call this factor 𝑥 ∈ [0,1] 
and redefine our endogenous covariate as 𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠_𝑐ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛!,% = ∑ ∑ 𝑥%-5'∈)!56% 𝑐ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛',5.The 
cumulative number of friends that churn up to time 𝑡 is obtained with 𝑥 = 1. The lower the 𝑥 
in this specification the more the consumer discounts the past. In the limit, when 𝑥 = 0, only 
contemporaneous churn matters. The same approach is used to compute our instruments, that 
is, the number of friends of friends (not friends of the ego) that churn is also affected by the 
discount factor 𝑥. Tables 7 and 8 show the results obtained for the two instruments used 
throughout our paper. We observe that the effect of friends’ churn is still statistically 
significant in all specifications but, and as expected, its magnitude reduces with 𝑥. The more 
consumers forget the past the fewer signals from friends they have (or retain) to inform their 
decisions. In addition, we observe that there is still contagious churn when only 
contemporaneous signals are used by consumers (the case of 𝑥 = 0). Therefore, we find 
evidence that contagious churn may have both a compounding nature as well as an immediate 
nature. The compounding nature comes from the fact that contagious churn is stronger when 
consumers remember the past more and compound, at some rate, all prior signals from their 
friends. The immediate nature comes from the fact that there is still contagious churn even 
when only contemporaneous churn from friends is taken into account. 
XXX TABLE 7 XXX 
XXX TABLE 8 XXX 
Conclusions 
Churn management has become a nuclear task in customer relationship management. One 
way to prevent churn is to sign consumers into long-term contracts, which require consumers 
to pay significant fees to terminate them before expiry. For this reason, and in particular in 
mobile markets, a number of consumers prefers pre-paid SIM cards, which they top up as 
they go. Placing calls with pre-paid tariff plans is usually more expensive than with long-term 
contracts but consumers can terminate their relationship with the carrier by simply winding 
down their remaining balance. Two major types of tariff plans are available in the market 
today for pre-paid consumers. Under one type of tariff plan placing calls to subscribers in the 
same carrier is cheaper than placing calls to subscribers in other carriers. Under another type 
of tariff plan all calls are priced equally. Some consumers choose one type of tariff plan over 
the other. For example, consumers that are risk averse adopt a tariff plan that charges the 
same price to call inside and outside the carrier and thus they do not need to consider which 
carrier their friend belongs to before calling them. On the other hand, users that are risk 
loving will choose a tariff plan that charges a lower price to call subscribers inside the carrier 
if most of their friends are in this carrier. Otherwise, if most of their friends are in another 
carrier then they are likely to move to that carrier and choose this type of tariff plan there. 
More interestingly, users in between will not always choose the same type of tariff plan and 
will move from a tariff plan that charges a lower price to call users inside the same carrier to 
a tariff plan that charges the same price for all calls if a significant number of their friends 
churn. Our paper identifies this nuanced consumer behavior as an early warning of churn. 
Another nuanced behavior that we find is that even before changing the type of tariff plan 
consumers are likely to adjust their volume of calls inside vs. outside the carrier when their 
friends start churning, which provides yet another early warning to the firm that consumers 
may be closer to churn. 
Our paper looks at how the decisions of friends about which carrier to choose affect one’s 
decision to change tariff plan or to churn. Given the strong positive network externalities in 
mobile markets, consumers are likely to start by subscribing service from the carrier which 
most of their friends subscribe to. A subscriber whose friends churn and move to a 
competitor is then likely to adjust her behavior. If only a few friends churn, then the likely 
behavior might be to simply adjust calls taking into account the increased price of calling the 
friends that churned. If more friends churn, then the likely behavior might be to change to a 
tariff plan that charges the same price to call inside and outside the carrier. If a significant 
number of friends churn, then the likely behavior might be to just churn altogether. In this 
paper, we develop a theoretical model showing how consumers make these decisions thus 
explaining in detail the behavioral process towards churn. As a result of using this approach 
to model consumer behavior, we show that 1) in a world without a tariff plan that charges the 
same price to call inside and outside the carrier, subscribers choose the carrier where most of 
their friends are; 2) the introduction of this type of tariff plan helps retain some consumers 
with more friends outside the carrier that would otherwise churn. 
We use a 11-month long panel of data from a large mobile provider to empirically test our 
hypotheses. We random sample 10,000 consumers and analyze their friends and friends of 
their friends, using data from more than 2.5 million subscribers. We show how friends’ churn 
affects the propensity of subscribers to choose a tariff plan that charges the same price to call 
inside and outside the carrier and the propensity to churn. A contribution of our paper is the 
methodology we use to identify this effect that is typically endogenous in network settings. 
We use the churn decisions from friends of friends not friends of the ego to instrument the 
churn decision of friends of the ego. With respect to the exogeneity of this instrumental 
variable we show that the churn decision of friends of friends is irrelevant for the churn 
decision of the ego when the friend that connects them does not churn. Armed with this 
instrument, we estimate an ordered probit model to account for the order in which consumers 
may move from i) adjusting their volume of calls inside vs. outside the carrier; to 
ii) choosing a tariff plan that charges the same price to call inside and outside the carrier; to 
iii) churning. Our empirical analyses show that, on average across subscribers in our dataset, 
every time an additional friend churns the ego’s monthly likelihood of churn increases by 
0.06%. Across our dataset, the monthly churn rate is 2.15%. This model also shows that a 
significant number of subscribers that would otherwise churn remain with the carrier and 
choose a tariff plan that charges the same price to call users inside and outside the carrier. We 
show that the introduction of this tariff plan avoided 5.94% in the monthly churn rate. 
Our results are significant in three ways. First, we provide empirical evidence that consumers 
that churn in mobile markets exhibit a path to death. When only a few friends churn the 
immediate behavioral response is to adjust the volume of calls. If more friends churn, then 
users are likely to switch to a tariff plan that charges the same price to call inside and outside 
the carrier. Finally, if many friends churn then users are likely to churn too. This ordered 
stream of user behaviors that telecommunication firms can observe may therefore provide 
them with early warnings of churn. The prior literature connected the path to death in 
telecommunications services to usage. Here, we show that this concept can be enriched by 
looking, in addition, at the type of tariff plan that consumers subscribe and whether they 
change it. Second, we show empirical evidence of contagious churn in mobile markets. This 
implies that a definition of Customer Lifetime Value (CLTV) that includes only the present 
value of the future stream of profits on each specific consumer underestimates the value of 
consumers and particularly so for consumers that have many friends. Instead, CLTV should 
also take into account the role of peer influence in social networks and the fact that some 
consumers are worthier than others because, if nothing else, they have more friends to 
influence. Third, we show how introducing tariff plans with particular features can help 
reduce churn. In the context of mobile, we provide empirical evidence that tariff plans that 
charge the same price to call inside and outside the network are effective at reducing churn 
and we measure their economic value. 
A concept similar to tariff plans that charge the same price to call inside and outside the 
network can be applied in other markets and across industries. Take, for example, the case of 
sports facilities. Consider a city with two of such clubs where people go play tennis. Each 
person is a member of one club (and pays an annual fee) and pays to rent the tennis court on 
an hourly basis. One type of membership allows for renting the court for a small price (𝑝!" in 
our model) if you are playing another member of the club but requires a higher price (𝑝#$%) 
for the court if you want to bring in a guest from outside. Another type of membership 
charges always the same price (𝑝.) for the court no matter whether your opponent is a member 
of the same club or a guest from outside. In this market, the same dynamics that we study in 
our paper arise. A member that usually plays with other members of the same club should opt 
for the former type of membership. A member who mixes up and plays players from her club 
but also from other clubs should opt for the latter type of membership. Finally, a player that 
essentially plays players from another club should join that club. The latter type of 
membership retains the player that brings in players from other clubs to play with. The same 
dynamics arise, for example, with a video content distributor that charges a flat monthly fee 
to provide access to a library with content from multiple providers. This should reduce the 
likelihood of losing consumers to the specific video stores that own each piece of content. 
Appendices 
Derivation of Optimal Tariff Plans and Churn Decisions 
Let 𝑈!(𝑞!) = ∑ θ!,'𝑙𝑜𝑔8𝑞!,':'∈)! + ∑ β𝑞!'𝑠𝑝!'∈)!  represent the utility of user 𝑖 with tariff plan 
of type 𝑠𝑝!. This user maximizes her utility subject to the budget constraint ∑ 𝑞!'8𝑠𝑝!𝑝. +'∈)!
(1 − 𝑠𝑝!)𝑝!'
!"/#$%: ≤ 𝑤, where 𝑝!'
!"/#$% = 𝑝!"{𝑗 ∈ 𝐹!!"} + 𝑝#$%{𝑗 ∈ 𝐹!#$%}. Let 𝑝!'
#$%/!" =
𝑝#$%{𝑗 ∈ 𝐹!!"} + 𝑝!"{𝑗 ∈ 𝐹!#$%}. Therefore, the Lagrangian and its derivatives become: 








∂ℒ(𝓆𝒾; λ)/ ∂𝑞!' = θ!'/𝑞!' + β𝑠𝑝! − λ8𝑠𝑝!𝑝. + (1 − 𝑠𝑝!)𝑝!'
!"/#$%: 




Setting these derivatives to zero and solving for 𝑞!' and 𝜆 yields: 
8𝑞!' , λ: = 8θ!'𝑤8𝑠𝑝!/𝑝. + (1 − 𝑠𝑝!)/𝑝!'
!"/#$%:/θ! , θ!/𝑤 + 𝑠𝑝!β/𝑝.: 
Substituting into the user’s utility function and assuming a symmetric competitor in the 









⎧ { 𝜃!'𝑙𝑜𝑔 I8𝑤𝜃!':/8𝜃!𝑝!'
!"/#$%:K
'∈)!
, 𝑖𝑓	𝑠𝑝! = 0
{ 𝜃!'𝑙𝑜𝑔 I8𝑤𝜃!':/(𝜃!𝑝.)K
'∈)!




, 𝑖𝑓	𝑠𝑝! = 0	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑐ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛
 
Let β9 = (θ!𝑝./𝑤)𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝./𝑝#$%), β, = (θ!𝑝./𝑤)𝑙𝑜𝑔 I𝑝./J{𝑝!"𝑝#$%) and β+ =
(θ!𝑝./𝑤)𝑙𝑜𝑔8𝑝./𝑝!":. In addition, let 𝑡#/! = L𝑙𝑜𝑔8𝑝./𝑝!": − (β𝑤)/(θ!𝑝.)M/[𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝#$%/𝑝.) +
(β𝑤)/(θ!𝑝.)]. The above formulation is particularly useful to derive the following 
propositions, which combined generate Figure 9: 
1) 𝑠𝑝! = 0 is preferred to 𝑠𝑝! = 0	and	churn for any 𝛽 if θ#$%/θ!" < 1 and otherwise if 
θ#$%/θ!" > 1. 
Proof: ∑ 𝜃!'𝑙𝑜𝑔 I8𝑤𝜃!':/8𝜃!𝑝!'




!"/#$%:'∈)! > 0 ⇔ 𝜃
!"𝑙𝑜𝑔8𝑝#$%/𝑝!": + 𝜃#$%𝑙𝑜𝑔8𝑝!"/𝑝#$%: > 0 ⇔
𝜃#$%/𝜃!" < 1. 
2) 𝑠𝑝! = 0 is preferred to 𝑠𝑝! = 1 ∨ 𝑠𝑝! = 1	and	churn for any 8θ#$% , θ!": if β < β9, for 
0 ≤ θ#$%/θ!" < 𝑡#/! if β9 < β < β+ and for no 8θ#$% , θ!": when β > β+. 
Proof: we want to show that ∑ θ!'𝑙𝑜𝑔 I8𝑤θ!':/8θ!𝑝!'
!"/#$%:K'∈)! >
∑ θ!'𝑙𝑜𝑔 I8𝑤θ!':/(θ!𝑝.)K'∈)! + β𝑤/𝑝., which is the same as θ
!"𝑙𝑜𝑔8𝑝./𝑝!": +
θ#$%𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝./𝑝#$%) > β𝑤/𝑝.. It is immediate that this is true for all 8θ#$% , θ!": when 
β < (θ!𝑝./𝑤)𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝./𝑝#$%) because 𝑝!" < 𝑝#$% implies θ!"𝑙𝑜𝑔8𝑝./𝑝!": +
θ#$%𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝./𝑝#$%) > θ!𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝./𝑝#$%). Likewise, this is never true when β >
(θ!𝑝./𝑤)𝑙𝑜𝑔8𝑝./𝑝!": because 𝑝!" < 𝑝#$% implies θ!"𝑙𝑜𝑔8𝑝./𝑝!": + θ#$%𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝./
𝑝#$%) > θ!𝑙𝑜𝑔8𝑝./𝑝!":. Finally, for (θ!𝑝./𝑤)𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝./𝑝#$%) < β < (θ!𝑝./𝑤)𝑙𝑜𝑔8𝑝./
𝑝!": this proposition amounts to show that θ#$%8𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝./𝑝#$%) + (β𝑤)/(𝑝.θ!): <
θ!" I𝑙𝑜𝑔8𝑝./𝑝!": − (β𝑤)/(𝑝.θ!)K and therefore θ#$%/θ!" < 𝑡#/!. 
3) 𝑠𝑝! = 0	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑐ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛 is preferred to 𝑠𝑝! = 1 ∨ 𝑠𝑝! = 1	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑐ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛 for any 8𝜃#$% , 𝜃!": 
if 𝛽 > 𝛽+, for 𝜃#$%/𝜃!" > 1/𝑡#/! if 𝛽9 < 𝛽 < 𝛽+ and for no 8𝜃#$% , 𝜃!": when 𝛽 < 𝛽9. 
Proof: we want to show that ∑ 𝜃!'𝑙𝑜𝑔 I8𝑤𝜃!':/8𝜃!𝑝!'
#$%/!":K'∈)! >
∑ 𝜃!'𝑙𝑜𝑔 I8𝑤𝜃!':/(𝜃!𝑝.)K'∈)! + 𝛽𝑤/𝑝., which is the same as 𝜃
!"𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝./𝑝#$%) +
𝜃#$%𝑙𝑜𝑔8𝑝./𝑝!": > 𝛽𝑤/𝑝.. It is immediate that this is true for all 8𝜃#$% , 𝜃!": when 
𝛽 < (𝜃!𝑝./𝑤)𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝./𝑝#$%) because 𝑝!" < 𝑝#$% implies 𝜃!"𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝./𝑝#$%) +
𝜃#$%𝑙𝑜𝑔8𝑝./𝑝!": > 𝜃!𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝./𝑝#$%). Likewise, this is never true when 𝛽 >
(𝜃!𝑝./𝑤)𝑙𝑜𝑔8𝑝./𝑝!": because 𝑝!" < 𝑝#$% implies 𝜃!"𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝./𝑝#$%) + 𝜃#$%𝑙𝑜𝑔8𝑝./
𝑝!": < 𝜃!𝑙𝑜𝑔8𝑝./𝑝!":. Finally, for (𝜃!𝑝./𝑤)𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝./𝑝#$%) < 𝛽 < (𝜃!𝑝./𝑤)𝑙𝑜𝑔8𝑝./𝑝!": 
this proposition amounts to show that 𝜃#$% I𝑙𝑜𝑔8𝑝!"/𝑝.: + (𝛽𝑤)/(𝑝.𝜃!)K <
𝜃!"8𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝./𝑝#$%) − (𝛽𝑤)/(𝑝.𝜃!): and therefore 𝜃#$%/𝜃!" > 1/𝑡#/!. 
4) 𝑡#/! < 1 ⇔ 1/𝑡#/! > 1 ⇔ 𝑝. < J𝑝!"𝑝#$% exp{ (β𝑤)/(θ!𝑝.)} when 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝./𝑝#$%) <
(β𝑤)/(θ!𝑝.) < 𝑙𝑜𝑔8𝑝./𝑝!":. 
Proof: the first part follows from noting that 𝑡#/! > 0 for these values of 𝛽. Also for 
this values of 𝛽, 𝑡#/! < 1 ⇔ 𝑙𝑜𝑔8𝑝./𝑝!": − (𝛽𝑤)/(𝜃!𝑝.) < 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝#$%/𝑝.) +
(𝛽𝑤)/(𝜃!𝑝.) ⇔ 𝑙𝑜𝑔8𝑝0/𝑝!"𝑝#$%: < 2(𝛽𝑤)/(𝜃!𝑝.) from where the second part 
follows immediately 
XXX FIGURE 9 XXX 
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Figure 1 - Optimal tariff plan type (𝑠𝑝 = 0/1) and churn decision a function of the risk profile (𝛽) and 
of the ratio of aggregated utility inside (𝜃&') and outside (𝜃()*) the carrier. 
 
	
(a) 𝑠𝑝 = 0 (b) 𝑠𝑝 = 1 
Figure 2 - Average airtime for calls placed inside and outside the carrier over time. 
 
	
(a) 𝑠𝑝 = 0 (b) 𝑠𝑝 = 1 
Figure 3 - Histogram for airtime inside the carrier in March 2009 (trimmed at 90% percentile). 
 
	
(a) 𝑠𝑝 = 0 (b) 𝑠𝑝 = 1 
Figure 4 - Join rate and churn rate over time broken-down by whether subscribers spent more 
or less time calling inside the network. 
 
	
(a) 𝑠𝑝 = 0 (b) 𝑠𝑝 = 1 
Figure 5 - Average number of friends that churn for eventual churners and non-churners over 
time and cumulative (𝑠𝑝 = 0 indicates using a tariff plan that charges a lower price to call 
inside the carrier, 𝑠𝑝 = 1 indicates using a tariff plan that charges the same price to call inside 
and outside the carrier). 
 
	
(a) 𝑠𝑝 = 0 (b) 𝑠𝑝 = 1 
Figure 6 - Average number of friends that join for eventual churners and non-churners over 
time and cumulative (𝑠𝑝 = 0 indicates using a tariff plan that charges a lower price to call 
inside the carrier, 𝑠𝑝 = 1 indicates using a tariff plan that charges the same price to call inside 
and outside the carrier). 
 
	
Figure 7 - Friends of friends (𝑘) not friends of the ego (𝑖) lie in different network cliques. The 




Figure 8 - Friends of friends not friends (𝑘) of the ego (𝑖) with only one common friend (𝑗) lie in 
different network cliques that intersect only at that friend. The churn decision of the former is 
used to instrument the churn decision of the only common friend (𝑗). 
 
	
Figure 9 - Optimal tariff plan type (𝑠𝑝 = 0/1) and churn decision as functions of the “peace of 
mind” effect (𝛽) and of the ratio of aggregated utility inside (𝜃&') and outside (𝜃()*) the carrier. 
 
    
 𝜃!"#/𝜃$% < 1 𝜃!"#/𝜃$% ≥ 	1 Total 
Total 7206 977 8183 
 (44748) (6140) (50888) 
𝑠𝑝 = 0  3653 238 3891 
 (19894) (1358) (21252) 
𝑠𝑝 = 1  4769 810 5579 
 (24854) (4782) (29636) 
𝐶ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛  0.021 0.024 0.022 
 (0.144) (0.152) (0.145) 
𝐶ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛	&	𝑠𝑝 = 0  0.013 0.012 0.012 
 (0.111) (0.108) (0.111) 
𝐶ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛	&	𝑠𝑝 = 1  0.028 0.027 0.028 
 (0.165) (0.163) (0.165) 
Number of distinct users (number of observations in parenthesis) for total, 𝑠𝑝 = 0 and 𝑠𝑝 = 1 
Average rates (standard deviation in parenthesis) for 𝑐ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛, 𝑐ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛	&	𝑠𝑝 = 0 and 𝑐ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛	&	𝑠𝑝 = 1 (in terms of observations) 
 
Table 1 - Number of users and churn rates as a function of number of friends inside and 
outside the carrier (𝑠𝑝 = 0 indicates using a tariff plan that charges a lower price to call inside 
the carrier, 𝑠𝑝 = 1 indicates using a tariff plan that charges the same price to call inside and 
outside the carrier). 
 
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 % costs with call inside the carrier 
% friends churn -0.0559 -0.218*** -0.0319 -0.156*** 
 (-1.34) (-3.63) (-0.79) (-2.82) 
% friends join 0.0787*** 0.140***   
 (2.66) (3.25)   
Constant 0.925*** 0.833*** 0.930*** 0.839*** 
 (204.23) (17.20) (220.69) (17.00) 
Tariff Plan Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 24788 20732 24788 20732 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 2 - Shift in calls inside and outside the carrier when friends churn (and the ego does 
not). 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Churn Churn 
Churn fncfnf 0.000161  
 (0.89)  
Friends join 0.000559 0.00250 
 (0.21) (0.98) 
Churn fncfnf 1path  -0.0000331 
  (-0.17) 
Tariff Plan Dummies Yes Yes 
Month Dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 47005 47005 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 3 - Churn decisions of friends of friends do not affect churn decisions of egos when the 
subscribers that connect them do not churn. 
 
 (O Probit) (IV O Probit) (IV O Probit) 
 state state state 
Main Result    
𝜃!"#/𝜃$%  0.218*** 0.312*** 0.304*** 
 (7.81) (6.69) (6.88) 
First Stage    
Churn ffnf  0.483***  
  (11.19)  
Churn ffnf 1path   0.526*** 
   (12.23) 
Constant  -0.443*** -0.459*** 
  (-5.96) (-6.63) 
cut-off 1 -0.162*** -0.0672*** -0.0704*** 
 (-8.52) (-2.73) (-2.95) 
cut-off 2 2.105*** 2.198*** 2.195*** 
 (100.07) (87.59) (89.23) 
Marginal Effect    
𝑠𝑝$ = 0  -0.085*** -0.121*** -0.118*** 
 (-7.82) (-6.70) (-6.88) 
𝑠𝑝$ = 1  0.074*** 0.106*** 0.103*** 
 (7.77) (6.70) (6.88) 
𝑐ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛  0.011*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 
 (7.92) (6.53) (6.74) 
Estimated Probability    
𝑠𝑝$ = 0  0.411 0.411 0.411 
𝑠𝑝$ = 1  0.568 0.568 0.568 
𝑐ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛  0.0206 0.0206 0.0206 
Month Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 50888 50888 50888 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 4 - Ordered Probit and Ordered IV Probit results. 
 




 state state 
Main Result    
𝜃!"#/𝜃$%  0.063*** 0.119*** 
 (0.03)  (0.02)  
First Stage    
𝐶ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛	𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑓  0.080***  
 (0.01)   
𝐶ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛	𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑓	1𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ   0.121*** 
  (0.02)  
Constant  0.382*** 0.362*** 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  
cut-off 1  -0.536***  -0.514***  
 (0.03)  (0.026)  
cut-off 2  1.872***  1.895***  
 (0.03)  (0.02)  
Marginal Effect    
𝑠𝑝$ = 0  -0.025***  -0.047***  
 (0.013)  (0.009)  
𝑠𝑝$ = 1  0.022***  0.042***  
 (0.011)  (0.008)  
𝑐ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛  0.002***  0.004***  




𝑠𝑝$ = 0  0.423  0.423  
𝑠𝑝$ = 1  0.564  0.564  
𝑐ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛  0.0134  0.0134  




 state state 
Main Result    
𝜃!"#/𝜃&#'!%($%   0.467*** 0.453*** 
 (0.110)  (0.156)  
𝜃!"#/𝜃)*+,$%   0.314*** 0.359*** 
 (0.06)  (0.09)  
First Stages    
𝐶ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛	𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑓	𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔  0.019***  
 (0.001)   
𝐶ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛	𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑓	𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑘  0.022***  
 (0.001)   
𝐶ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛	𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑓	𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔	1𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ   0.015*** 
  (0.002)  
𝐶ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛	𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑓	𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑘	1𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ   0.017*** 
  (0.002)  
Constant  -0.192** -0.219*** 
 (0.10)  (0.10)  
cut-off 1  -3.114***  -3.124***  
 (0.247)  (0.247)  
cut-off 2  0.647***  0.637***  
 (0.244)  (0.0244)  
Marginal Effect    
Strong friends:   
𝑠𝑝$ = 0  -0.180***  -0.174***  
 (0.042)  (0.060)  
𝑠𝑝$ = 1  0.179***  0.0174***  
 (0.042)  (0.060)  




 state state 
Main Result    
𝜃!"#/𝜃)*$(-#*.$%   0.901** 1.574*** 
 (0.44)  (0.403)  
First Stage    
𝐶ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛	𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑓	𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑  0.446***  
 (0.09)   
𝐶ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛	𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑓	1𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ	𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑   0.394*** 
  (0.09)  
Constant  0.022*** 0.022*** 
 (0.002)  (0.003)  
cut-off 1  -0.450***  
-
0.618***  
 (0.03)  (0.032)  
cut-off 2  1.782***  1.787***  
 (0.02)  (0.02)  
Marginal Effect    





 (0.171)  (0.158)  
𝑠𝑝$ = 1  0.323***  0.561***  
 (0.156)  (0.141)  
churn  0.030***  0.055***  
 (0.015)  (0.017)  
Estimated Probability    
𝑠𝑝$ = 0  0.421  0.422  
𝑠𝑝$ = 1  0.566  0.564  
Month Dummies  Yes  Yes  
Call Volume  Yes  Yes  
Observations  50817  50817  
 
𝑐ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛  0.0004***  0.0004***  
 (0.00012)  (0.00015)  
Weak friends:   
𝑠𝑝$ = 0  -0.121***  -0.139***  
 (0.024)  (0.035)  
𝑠𝑝$ = 1  0.121***  0.0138***  
 (0.024)  (0.035)  
𝑐ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛  0.0004***  0.0004***  
 (0.0003)  (0.0001)  
Estimated Probability    
𝑠𝑝$ = 0  0.397  0.397  
𝑠𝑝$ = 1  0.603  0.603  
churn  0.0002  0.0002  
Month Dummies  Yes  Yes  
Call Volume  Yes  Yes  
Observations  47999  47999  
 
𝑐ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛  0.0128  0.0136  
Month Dummies  Yes  Yes  
Call Volume  Yes  Yes  
Observations  50888  50888 
 
Table 5 – Robustness checks for the definition of friends. 
 
 Tariff Plan Churn 
 (IV O Probit) (IV O Probit) (IV O Probit) (IV O Probit) 
 state  state  state  state 
Main Result      
𝜃!"#/𝜃$%  0.317***  0.302**  0.101***  0.080*** 
 (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
First Stage      
𝐶ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛	𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑓  0.476***   0.486***   
 (0.05)   (0.05)   
𝐶ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛	𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑓	1𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ   0.518***   0.523*** 
  (0.05)   (0.05)  
Constant  -0.430***  -0.446***  -0.434***  -0.444*** 
 (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.10)  (0.10) 
cut-off 1  -0.405***  -0.411***    
 (0.03)  (0.03)    
cut-off 2    1.673***  1.665***  
   (0.04)  (0.04)  
Marginal Effect      
𝑠𝑝$ = 0  -0.124***  -0.119***    
 (0.020)  (0.018)    
𝑠𝑝$ = 1  0.124***  0.119***  -0.008***  -0.006** 
 (0.020)  (0.018)  (0.004)  (0.003) 
𝑐ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛    0.008***  0.006** 
   (0.004)  (0.003) 
Estimated Probability      
𝑠𝑝$ = 0  0.433  0.433    
𝑠𝑝$ = 1  0.567  0.566  0.964  0.964 
𝑐ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛    0.036  0.036 
Month Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Call Volume  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations  49793  49793  49793  49793 
 
Baseline: symmetric tariff plan  (IV MNL) (IV MNL) 
 state  state  
Tariff plan lower price inside    
𝜃!"#/𝜃$%  -0.686***  -0.637***  
 (0.05)  (0.04)  
1st Stage Residuals  0.534***  0.481 
 (0.05)  (0.05)  
Constant  -0.674***  -0.692***  
 (0.03)  (0.03)  
Churn    
𝜃!"#/𝜃$%  0.265***  0.194**  
 (0.10)  (0.10)  
1st Stage Residuals  -0.878***  -0.821***  
 (0.09)  (0.07)  
Constant  -3.219***  -3.172***  
 (0.11)  (0.10)  
Month Dummies  Yes  Yes 
Call Volume  Yes  Yes  
Observations  50862  50862 
 
Table 6 – Robustness checks for the ordering of outcomes. 
 





















 state state state state state state state state state state state 
Remembering 
Effect 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 
𝜃!"#/𝜃$%  0.263*** 0.247*** 0.233*** 0.222*** 0.212*** 0.204*** 0.197*** 0.191*** 0.186*** 0.181*** 0.177*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
First Stage            
Churn ffnf 0.455*** 0.550*** 0.633*** 0.702*** 0.756*** 0.797*** 0.829*** 0.852*** 0.869*** 0.882*** 0.892*** 






















 (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 





















 (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
cut-off 2 1.958*** 1.951*** 1.945*** 1.940*** 1.936*** 1.932*** 1.929*** 1.927*** 1.924*** 1.922*** 1.921*** 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Month 
Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Call Volume Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 50862 50862 50862 50862 50862 50862 50862 50862 50862 50862 50862 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 7 - Effect of friends' churn on the state of the ego with remembrance discount factor 
(using “ffnf” as IV). 
 





















 state state state state state state state state state state state 
Remembering 
Effect 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 
𝜃!"#/𝜃$%  0.243*** 0.229*** 0.218*** 0.207*** 0.199*** 0.192*** 0.186*** 0.181*** 0.176*** 0.172*** 0.169*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
First Stage            
Churn ffnf 0.501*** 0.595*** 0.674*** 0.738*** 0.786*** 0.823*** 0.850*** 0.870*** 0.885*** 0.896*** 0.904*** 






















 (0.07) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 





















 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
cut-off 2 1.951*** 1.944*** 1.939*** 1.934*** 1.931*** 1.928*** 1.925*** 1.923*** 1.921*** 1.919*** 1.917*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Month 
Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Call Volume Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 50862 50862 50862 50862 50862 50862 50862 50862 50862 50862 50862 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 8 - Effect of friends' churn on the state of the ego with remembrance discount factor 
(using “ffnf 1 path” as IV). 
 
